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Dallas Court of Appeals cases for the week of January 10, 2011

For the week of January 10, 2011, the Dallas Court of Appeals issued fourteen opinions in civil cases.  Nine of these dispose of a case without a detailed discussion of the merits (e.g., dismissing a case for want of prosecution, dismissing a case for mootness, dismissing a case pursuant to settlement).  The remaining five cases are as follows:

Alim v. KBR (05-09-00395-CV) – Recites well-established holding that a neutral arbitrator exhibits evident partiality if he does not disclose facts that might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality.

Brown v. Ogbolu (05-09-00371-CV) – Recites well-established (1) elements which must be established in a restricted appeal; (2) rule that evidence which was not before the trial court prior to final judgment may not be considered in a restricted appeal; (3) holding that civil procedure rule does not require the date or manner or service to be included in a certificate of service; (4) elements of breach of contract claim; (5) definition of “benefit-of-the-bargain measure” of damages; and (6) rule that it is impermissible for a default judgment to award damages exceeded the damages pleaded.

Conquest v. Spencer (05-09-00942-CV) – Recites well-established rule that a party may extend post-judgment time line if, among other things, the party proves that it received notice of the judgment more than twenty but less than ninety-one days after it was signed.

Dallas County v. Cedar Springs Invs., L.L.C. (05-10-00443-CV) – Recites well-established rule that taxpayers in Texas have standing to seek to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds and need not demonstrate a particularized injury.

Webb v. Stockford (05-08-01330-CV) – Recites well-established (1) elements of a legal malpractice claim; (2) standard for reviewing trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (3) definition of “misrepresentation”; and (4) holding that silence may be equivalent to a false representation only when the particular circumstances impose a duty on the party to speak and he deliberately remains silent.