For the week of August 23, 2010, the Dallas Court of Appeals issued fourteen opinions in civil cases. Nine of these dispose of a case without a detailed discussion of the merits (e.g., dismissing a case for want of prosecution, dismissing a case for mootness, dismissing a case pursuant to settlement). The remaining five cases are as follows:
Kaye/Bassman Int’l Corp. v. Help Desk Now, Inc. (05-08-01708-CV) – Recites well-established (1) traditional summary judgment standard; (2) no-evidence summary judgment standard;(3) rule that, when the provisions of a contract appear to conflict, a court should attempt to harmonize the provisions and assume that the parties intended every provision to have some effect; (4) principle that it is improper to grant a motion for summary judgment based on a contract when the contract is ambiguous, as interpretation of an ambiguous contract is a fact issue; and (5) rule that, if a ground for summary judgment was not presented in writing to the trial court, it cannot be considered by the court of appeals.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Bostic (05-08-01390-CV) – Recites well-established (1) standard for reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence; (2) definition of “general causation”; and (3) principle as to what must be established to prove “specific causation”.
Latham v. Burgher (05-08-01477-CV) – Recites well-established (1) standard for reviewing trial court’s instructions section of jury charge; (2) definition of “actual fraud” in the context of piercing the corporate veil; (3) standard for reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence; (4) standard for reviewing factual sufficiency of the evidence; and (5) standard for applying alter ego doctrine in piercing the corporate veil.
Preston Nat’l Bank v. Stuttgard Auto Ctr, Inc. (05-09-00020-CV) – Recites well-established (1) no-evidence summary judgment standard; and (2) rule that, when multiple grounds are raised in a motion for summary judgment and the trial court does not specify the grounds relied upon for its ruling, the appellate court will affirm the summary judgment if any of the grounds advanced in the motion are meritorious.
Taylor v. Fossett (05-09-01271-CV) – Recites well-established (1) standard for reviewing trial court’s order on motion to dismiss a health care liability claim; (2) principle that a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts; and (3) requirements imposed upon an “expert report” in the context of a health care liability claim.